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If you search for wealth, you will not find happiness. 
If you search for happiness, you will not find wealth 





















Abstract -  Two recent research branches have called into question the hypothesis that the economic subject 
is rational and egoist, that is to say, that his/her sole objective is to maximize his/her own personal material 
interests. In the first place, the literature on the so-called happiness paradox has seriously put in question the 
given, widely diffused not only in the doctrine but also in the common perception, that a higher level of 
material welfare necessarily leads to a greater level of personal well being or happiness, on an individual 
level but even more so on a collective one. In the second place, experimental economics has produced a 
wealth of results that, vice versa, confirm something that the common sense and the personal observation of 
many had already suspected: economic subjects do not all and not always pursue exclusively the 
maximization of their own personal interests. This work critically discusses these two approaches and 
analyzes their interesting implications in economic policy. 
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1  Introduction 
A great part of traditional economic theory is based on the hypothesis that the economic 
subject, whose behavior is under study, is rational and egoistical, that is to say, that his/her sole 
objective is to maximize his/her personal material interest. The strength and the appeal of this 
theory lies in the corollary of the “invisible hand”, which assures that the maximization of 
individual interest guarantees, under certain conditions, also the efficiency, in a Paretian sense, of 
collective interest. Implicit as well is the hypothesis that the maximization of material interests 
necessarily causes the subject to obtain a greater level of personal happiness or well being.  
Two separate and independent research branches have recently brought to light certain 
empiric and experimental results that constitute a serious critique of the traditional position. In the 
first place, the literature on the so-called happiness paradox has seriously called into question the 
given, widely diffused non only in doctrine but also in the common perception, that a higher level 
of material welfare necessarily leads to a greater level of personal happiness or well being, on an 
individual level but even more so on a collective one. In second place, a branch of experimental 
economics has produced a mass of results that, vice versa, confirm something that the common 
sense and the personal observation of many had already suspected: economic subjects do not all and 
not always pursue exclusively the maximization of their own personal interests. 
These two approaches have remained distinct up to now, aside from very rare exceptions. 
However, the links between the two lines of investigation are evident and each one could be seen as 
supporting and complementing the other. The main connection derives from the fact that both lines, 
even if often unconsciously, take off from the same starting point: markets are incomplete and there 
are certain goods that intrinsically evade the commercial transaction and that, instead, profoundly 
influence individual well-being; money, therefore, intended as the numeraire good, is not capable of 
allowing us to acquire all those goods, both material and non, that we desire and that determine our 
degree of happiness and well being. Sometimes, moreover, the pursuit of material interests can 
occur only at the price of relinquishing at least some of those goods that money cannot buy. If this 
is true, then on the one side we can understand why not always that action is chosen, which 
guarantees the greatest material return possible (the experimental results on social preferences), and 
on the other side we find the explanation as to why an increase in collective material wealth does 
not necessarily lead to the subjective perception of a greater level of happiness (the happiness 
paradox).  
The other aspect for which the two lines of research are worth being considered jointly is the 
significant effect that they have, or should have, on economic policy: both in terms of objectives 
and of tools of economic policy. In the traditional view, the objective of economic policy could not 
but coincide with the maximization of quantitative aggregates, for example, the GDP. Implicitly, it 
was taken for granted that it was neither possible nor necessary to quantify individual well being or 
personal happiness, since the availability of material goods is a more than adequate proxy for 
individual well being. If, on the other hand, it is possible to monitor subjective personal well being 
or individual happiness, then it would be theoretically possible to revert to the objective of 
economic policy as it had been identified by classical economists, that is, the maximization of 
collective happiness.  
These two branches of the literature set forth the suggestion that public choices can no 
longer be ranked by taking into account only their effects on the national product, without 
considering other indices also of a quantitative nature, starting from the sample surveys on the level 
of happiness perceived by citizens. The two approaches mentioned above, however, obviously 
suggest also a redefinition of the tools and of the intermediate objectives of economic policy. On 
the one hand, the incompleteness of markets and the dependence of individual well being on a 
series of goods that would have once been defined as non-economic, such as affective relationships 
and relational goods, determines the necessity of a profound rethinking of the traditional tools of 
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economic policy. On the other hand, the coexistence of subjects endowed with social preferences 
alongside subjects traditionally endowed with egoistical preferences proposes completely new 
policy tools that may be capable of allowing the emergence, defense and diffusion of a system of 
social preferences. 
The work has been organized as follows. Firstly, the two research branches are analyzed 
separately, obviously without the pretense of being exhaustive, but rather with the desire of 
enucleating those aspects that appear more interesting for the purposes of our argumentation. 
Successively, the main and most interesting implications of economic policy will be discussed.  
2  The happiness paradox 
From a scientific viewpoint, the “happiness paradox” is as simple as it is fascinating1. A by 
now significant amount of empirical studies, which begin with the pioneering work of Easterlin 
(1974), show that the sensation of well being subjectively perceived by individuals in developed 
countries has not increased in the post-war era, even though the real per capita income, that is to 
say, the average availability of material goods, augmented dramatically in the same period 
(Benchflower and Oswald, 2000, Diener and Oishi, 2000 and Easterlin 1995).  
 
Happiness, as is obvious, cannot be objectively observed. Equally indisputably, however, it 
is subjectively perceived by individuals as a feeling of well being (subjective well being, SWB): the 
indicator that is employed in these studies is based, in fact, on the results of interviews in which 
subjects were requested to evaluate their well being. Figure 1 (taken from Layard, 2003) shows the 
series regarding per capita income in the USA, along with the percentage of the interviewees that 
declared themselves as very happy; while income shows a more or less constant growth trend, the 
percentage of those who define themselves as very happy declines throughout the Sixties, 

















Source Layard (2003) 
 
 
The phenomenon, obviously, is not only American and analogous relationships have been 
obtained also for other countries. Figure 2 (taken from Frey and Stutzler, 2002) shows the trend in 
time of the percentage of those that declare themselves as very satisfied with their life in some 
                                                      
1 The reader can find a systematic treatment of the literature we refer to by consulting the book by Frey and 
Stuzer (2002) or the essay by Layard (2203). 
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major European countries; excepting some countries which demonstrate a slight counter-trend (for 
example, Italy, Germany, Denmark), the consistency or the slight decline of SWB in Europe is 





















Source Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) 
 
 
It would seem, therefore, that the increase in material wealth did not bring with it the rise in 
individual satisfaction and happiness forecast by the economic theory that is taught in basis 
economics courses.  
This result is, under closer consideration, even more intriguing when we note that these 
same inquiries produce different, and in some ways closer to those expected, results, if a given 
country is analyzed during a given time interval. In this case, there is a clear positive relationship 
between individual income and subjectively perceived well being: wealthier people report, on 
average, a greater SWB (Benchflower and Oswald, 2000, Easterlin, 2001, Di Tella, MacCulloch 










Very satisfied  22.80  24.98  28.07  33.07 
Rather satisfied   50.43  54.25  55.66  54.38 
Not very satisfied  18.86  15.65  12.66  9.82 
Not at all satisfied  7.92  5.11  3.61  2.73 
Source: Di Tella, MacCulloch, Oswald, 2001 
                                                      
2 For confirmation of the strength of the results, it is necessary to note that the question on the level of 
happiness placed to the European interviewees (Eurobarometer inquiry) is different (degree of satisfaction) 


















The relationship between income and happiness, however, appears non-linear and a 
decreasing marginal utility with respect to income is highlighted, as emerges when we look at 
Figure 3, which shows the relationship between average happiness and per capita income in 
America in two periods: the early Sixties and the early Nineties. It also appears evident that the 
trend of the relationship tends to diminish with the passing of time, a confirmation of the results 
analyzed previously. Furthermore, the degree of correlation between income and SWB appears 
mostly moderate in rich countries and more significant in poor ones (for example, 0.13 for the 






















Source:: Frey and Stutzer (2002) 
 
Popular wisdom often suggests that wealth does not guarantee happiness; econometric 
studies, which estimate the influence of various variables on SWB, support this common sense, 
showing how income is able to explain only a modest part of individual happiness, since there are 
other factors that detect why some subjects are happier than others. The results are obtained through 
what are called regressions of happiness, acquired by estimating a function of the following type 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004a):  
F = h[u(Y,OD,t)] + et 
where F is the self-reported number or level of happiness, u[..] is the, not directly discernible, “real” 
function of well being, Y is income and OD is the vector of the other determinants of happiness; 
lastly, h is a function that associates a value or a level of happiness reported by the subject to each 
                                                      
3 It is, furthermore, opportune to note that at least a part of the correlation between income and SWB could 
be determined by the fact that it is the latter to have a positive influence on income and not vice versa, in 
other words, happy individuals tend to earn more than unhappier ones.  For example, Diener et al. (2002) 
show that the degree of self-rated cheerfulness of 19 year old college students correlates positively with their 
personal income twenty years later, while Graham et al. (2004) find that subjects with higher residual 
happiness (that is to say, the happiness that cannot be explained by the usual determinants of well being) 
prove to be richer and in better health five years later. 
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“real” level of happiness and et is the error term4. Among the various repressors analyzed (see 
among others Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999, Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004a, Di Tella et al., 
2004 and Helliwell, 2002), we cite working conditions (unemployment has a negative influence on 
happiness as does also the sense of insecurity for one’s job), marital status (being married or living 
with someone has a positive effect on personal well being, while a separation, a divorce and the 
death of one’s spouse affect it negatively)5, the state of one’s health, as popular wisdom had always 
indicated, religious faith (those who indicate that God is important in their lives increase their 
happiness by two points, on a decimal scale6), the political environment, the macroeconomic 
variables. 
The joint observation of these two aspects, therefore, would seem to inspire the suggestive 
thesis that even though an individually higher income guarantees a greater degree of individual well 
being, this result disappears at a collective level when the income of all individuals increases. While 
a given individual who becomes richer also becomes happier, when a society as a whole becomes 
richer, this does not automatically increase collective happiness. Before we discuss the possible 
causes for this paradoxical result, let us briefly consider its strength. 
The first and most classic objection possible is that the paradox is nothing more than an 
optical illusion; subjects are actually happier, but due to the difficulty of (self) measuring a variable 
tricky enough to be evaluated quantitatively, such as happiness and well being, they do not show it. 
They could, for example, have simply raised the standard of well being that identifies the term 
“very happy”. On the other hand, happiness could be totally independent, at least in the long term, 
from contingent variables and be determined by characteristic traits of the personality of a probable 
genetic matrix (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996, Costa at al. 1996). Exogenous shocks, such as, for 
example, a variation in income, can cause a shift in perceived well being in the short term, but, 
successively, a psychological mechanism of adaptation would bring it back to the levels of the long 
term. In this case, it would be of scarce interest to study the relationship between income and 
happiness and the latter could exit the domain of the economist7.   
Numerous considerations, however, bring us to the conclusion that the happiness paradox is 
much more than an optical illusion. In the first place, there is a literature in psychology that testifies 
to the reliability and the coherence of the measurement of the well being of individuals through 
sample surveys that report SWB (for example, Argyle, 1989, and Pavot, and Diener, 1993) 8. 
Moreover, though the proposed works use subjectively perceived and manifested well being as a 
variable, the recent development of the science that studies the workings of the human brain has 
permitted to put into relation the sentiments and the emotions reported by subjects with measurable 
modifications of brain activity 9 (Davidson, 2000).  
                                                      
4 For obvious reasons, the function h is assumed to be stepwise monotone (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2004a). Given this characteristic of the dependent variable, the literature uses logit and probit models. 
5 Also the quantitative importance of the marital status should not come as a surprise because we can see it, 
obviously on an average, as a proxy, probably imperfect, of the wealth of the human relationships of the 
individual. In this sense, more recent studies underline also the important role of sexual activity 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004b). 
6 As confirmation that what counts is the strength of one’s religious faith, attendance in a place of worship is 
relatively less important. 
7 One cannot but agree with Layard (2004) when he notes that also in this case, however, one could 
determine a role of economic policy. Some somatic traits, such as, for example, height, have a significant 
genetic explanation; nevertheless, economic improvements have had a fundamental impact on raising 
average height. 
8 For example, Konow and Early, 1999 use a variety of different measurements of SWB and find a high 
degree of correlation between them. 
9 The study of the workings of the human brain in relation to the decisional process typical of economic 
science has recently given life to a research branch called neuro-economics, see Camerer et al. forthcoming. 
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Furthermore, the psychological mechanism of adaptation, when it exists, is slow and far 
from being complete (Easterling, 2004, Diener and Seligman 2004). 
On the other hand, there are other signals (detected in a completely independent fashion) of 
a worsening of social well being that have emerged clearly and distinctly in the last decades and 
that appear totally compatible with a decline in SWB. There has been a drastic increase in 
behavioral pathologies connected with the difficulty of living: clinical depressions, alcoholism, drug 
dependence, suicides. It is unquestionable that clinically ascertained depressions have increased, 
despite the presence of an undoubted rise in the standard of life, since the end of the Second World 
War, as has also the degree of diffuse anxiety (Twenge, 2000); similar data is available for suicides 
(Lane,200). Of particular interest is the trend in the consumption of alcohol: it diminished in many 
countries in the first quarter of the past century, remaining constant in the following twenty five 
years. In the post-war era, instead, the consumption of alcohol and alcoholism increased 
significantly almost everywhere (Silbereisen et al., 1995). The data on the diffusion of criminal 
activity, even if of a more difficult interpretation, also show the same growing trend. 
The cross-sectional analysis of various countries also substantiates the idea that further 
increments in income do not have an effect on happiness, at least above a certain value. Figure 4 
illustrates the percentage of those individuals, in the various countries considered, who report 
themselves as happy or satisfied on the vertical axis and the level of per capita income, expressed in 
US dollars, on the horizontal axis. When per capita income is low, close to subsistence levels, then 
its increase has positive effects on subjectively perceived well being; when per capita income 
exceeds a certain threshold, approximately 15,000 dollars, then further increments in income have 




















Source: Grahan and Pettinato, 2002 
 
Lastly, it is opportune to bear in mind the (neo) classic argument that, towards the end of the 
past century, rendered obsolete the thesis of cardinal utility/happiness: its basic redundancy. The 
problems tied to the measurability of utility have already been surmounted with the introduction of 
the concept of ordinal utility and with the tool of revealed preferences. For the neo-classic theory, 
in fact, it is not necessary to know the purpose of human behavior, that is, to know, define or even 
                                                      
10 It is interesting to note that the concept of happiness seems equally familiar to all cultures: individuals in 
all countries always seem to find it rather easy to answer questions on happiness. 
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measure that which the subject wants to obtain. It is sufficient to observe the individual choices of 
the subject: if subjects are coherent, what they choose permits us to trace back to their preference 
set, in other words, to reconstruct the order of preference with which they have structured available 
alternatives. The argument, however, works only if one assumes that market are complete; if 
markets are not complete, then certain alternatives, even though plausibly found among all those 
taken into consideration, are not available to the consumers when they make their choices. In this 
case, it is not always possible to retrace the preferences of the subjects simply by observing their 
choices. It is precisely the incompleteness of markets which makes it useful, if not necessary, to 
search for an alternative and more direct path for measuring the well being of individuals.  
From the arguments put forth, it appears more than evident that the happiness paradox, far 
from being an optical illusion or an intellectual curiosity, is actually a phenomenon waiting for an 
explanation. 
2.1  Explanations of the happiness paradox 
An exhaustive explanation of the paradox should be able to clarify why individuals who are richer, 
that is to say, who boast greater material well being, tend to declare a higher level of individual 
happiness, while when collective material well being, the per capita income, increases, this seems to 
have no or even a negative effect on the average SWB of the collectivity. The nature itself of the 
phenomenon, as we have described it, seems to suggest that the explanation lies in the interaction 
between individual choices and collective ones and between current choices and future ones. 
A widely diffused theory explains the failure as caused by the tensions between aspirations 
and their fulfillment. For example, Easterin, (2001) assumes that SWB depends positively on 
current income and negatively on aspirations over future income, and that the latter are based in 
great part on past income. The positive effect of current income on perceived well being is 
counterbalanced by the fact that aspirations have grown and this can explain the steadiness of SWB 
in time. In other words, when income rises, aspirations also increase and this has a depressive effect 
on the evaluation of one’s personal situation. While this argumentation surely seems to contain 
some elements with which one can agree, on the one hand, it does not seem sufficient as the sole 
explanation of the phenomenon, unless linked to other factors (Layard, 2003); on the other hand, it 
appears conceptually weak because it requires a theoretical justification of the fact that subjects are 
systematically fooled by their inspirations and do not learn to adjust their aspirations. 
A further explanation of the paradox is the one based on the consumption of positional and 
status goods (Cooper et al., 2001 and Frank, 1985, among others). While non-positional goods are 
acquired for their intrinsic capacity to satisfy a need, positional goods are acquired for their 
capacity to say something about the person that buys them. These goods, therefore, represent one 
manner in which the subject signals his or her social status with respect to people who do not 
possess them11. It is obvious that the satisfaction procured by the consumption of such goods is 
closely tied to the dissatisfaction of another individual and, therefore, the aggregate increase in the 
availability of these goods does not imply any rise in aggregate SWB. The positional or relative 
consumption of each person has, in fact, a negative externality on the utility of the next individual. 
Man, by his nature, places himself in a situation of rivalry with regards to others, obtaining well 
being not only, or not just, from his absolute material situation as much as from the relative 
situation. In the extreme case in which sole objective of subjects would be their relative 
consumption and not their absolute consumption, we would obtain the paradoxical results that 
                                                      
11 Economics does not differentiate between purchase and consumption. If, however, we accept the 
proposed approach, the difference between purchasing and consuming is manifest: it is, in fact, purchasing 
and taking possession of the good to be important and to signal our status. In some cases, the actual 
consumption, the fruition of the good, is secondary and marginal; maybe for this reason our homes are full of 
consumer goods that have been purchased but not or only partially used. 
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economic growth would have no effect whatsoever on collective well being. Nowadays, the most 
relevant positional good is probably income per se, since high income is associated with high status.   
The effect of the externality induced by positional consumption is strengthened by the fact 
that not all goods have the same capacity to signal status. There are, in fact, some goods that are not 
capable of indicating status or that, indeed, transmit negative signals. Actually, it is relatively easy 
to become aware of the fact that, for example, the good “time spent with one’s family” has 
generally no signaling effect or is, indeed, endowed with a negative signaling effect12. This is so 
because the price of leisure time is simply its opportunity cost: whoever consumes much leisure 
time could be doing so because it has a low opportunity cost, thus signaling the fact that the market 
puts a low value on the productive labor factor that the individual is willing to sell and that this 
individual occupies, therefore, an inferior position in social ranking13. The result is that the social 
optimum (which does not take in account externality) and the private optimum do not coincide: 
people work more and have less leisure time than would be optimal, in other words, than they 
would have in absence of the external effect. Attention to consumption and relative income is 
capable of explaining the phenomena recalled above. Indeed, the subjective well being reported by 
a person with a higher income will be, ceteris paribus, greater than the subjective well being of a 
person with a lower income, while the effects of the aggregate growth in income will be marginal 
because the relative income of individuals does not change. 
However the external effect produced by rival consumption is not the only externality that 
can explain the happiness paradox. If the growth process in real income and in the availability of 
material goods has negative effects on the consumption of other goods, this could have negative 
effects on personal well being.  
If we turn back for a moment to the happiness regression seen previously, we could 
synthesize it into the formula F=(Y, OD) where Y is income and OD are the other determinants of 
SWB. If markets were complete and, therefore, all goods could be purchased, then the role of OD 
would be marginal: maximizing income would automatically lead to the maximization of 
happiness14. If, on the contrary, not all good can be purchased, it is no longer correct to maintain 
that the maximization of income automatically leads to happiness. If these goods could not be 
purchased but were totally exogenous and independent of the choices of the subject, probably 
because genetically determined (beauty, health, a predisposition for happiness or depression, etc.), 
then the maximization of individual income would still be capable of maximizing well being. If 





 were negative, that is 
to say, if the pursuit of a higher income would lead to a diminution of the others factors that 
determine happiness then we would have another externality capable of explaining the happiness 
paradox.  
What could these goods be? An obvious category to be considered is that of public goods: 
these goods have no market and, furthermore, it goes without saying that the availability of most of 
them is negatively effected by economic growth (we are thinking of environmental public goods, 
seas, rivers and clean air, compromised by industrial production or by the consumption of certain 
private goods, private transport, domestic heating, etc). Furthermore, the fact that individual subjects 
can rationally respond to the disappearance or at least to the reduction of these goods (most of which were 
once free) by increasing the consumption of private goods may strengthen the externality effect (see 
Bartolini, forthcoming and the works cited therein). 
                                                      
12 Not all leisure time is necessarily without signaling effects on status: attending opening night at the Scala, 
for example, and occupying one of the VIP seats at the sports stadium are some examples to the contrary. 
13 It is interesting to note the difference with the past, and not even a remote past, when the maximum 
expression of opulence was represented by the fact of occupying one’s entire day with leisure time. 
14 In this case, the happiness function would be F=[Y,OD(Y)]. 
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Recently, a group of economists has underscored the importance of so called relational 
goods (Uhlaner, 1989 and Gui, 2000): these goods are intangible products of a communicative and 
affective nature and they are necessarily produced through the interaction between individuals or 
between an individual and a group. The productive process of such goods requires a combination of 
different inputs, both of a material and an immaterial nature, all specific, nevertheless, to the 
interaction that lies at the base of the productive process. They are local public goods in the sense 
that they are not rivals and not excludable for the subjects involved, but they differentiate 
themselves from these because in the case of relational goods, production and consumption 
necessarily coincide15. Furthermore, the production and consumption of these goods requires the 
mutual agreement of at least two individuals: relational goods cannot be purchased and, least of all, 
imposed. The necessary convergence of more wills in the joint production of relational goods 
determines also the chancy and uncertain nature of these goods. An individual may have the 
resources in terms of time and all other factors required to establish an affective relationship of any 
kind with another subject, but he/she may never be certain that the other subject has the same 
intensions.  
The empirical results analyzed previously highlight how SWB depends in a crucial manner 
on variables of a relational and affective nature (see among others Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999, 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004a). We have already seen how marital status influences the 
perception of subjective well being16: the feeling of well being diminishes in people who are 
separated, divorced or widowed (Helliwell, 2002)17. More recently, Blanchflower, and Oswald 
(2004b), show how sexual activity has a positive, relevant and monotone effect on subjective well 
being18. 
While the results on the positive effects of marriage on well being were widely known in the 
fields of psychology and sociology (see for example, Waite and Gallagher 2000), another results 
appears even more interesting (Helliwell, 2003): people who affirm that they trust their fellow 
person declare higher levels of SWB, just as the perception of SWB increases if one supposes that 
the climate of trust is diffuse in the environment where the subject lives19. As confirmation of the 
positive role that moral values play both on an individual as on a collective level, it has been 
verified (Helliwell, 2003) that personal well being increases not only if the subject thinks that 
evading taxes is morally reprehensible, but also if this individual lives in a context in which this 
sentiment is widely shared in society 20. 
It thus appears more then evident that individual well being depends on variables of an 
extra-mercantile type, which cannot be purchased using income. What remains to be explained is 
why, since income is only a marginal determinant of individual happiness, individuals do not 
dedicate more time to the consumption of immaterial and relational goods that bring happiness 
instead of dedicating so many efforts to accumulating money, which is not capable of buying 
happiness? It is thus necessary to hypothesize that there are certain failures in rationality that 
                                                      
15 Since no individual can enjoy these goods without participating in their production, the problem of free 
riding is not relevant for these goods. 
16 In this as in the other cases, there exists a serious problem in identifying the direction in the causality 
nexus: it may even be that it is unhappy people who have a lesser probability of getting married or a greater 
probability of divorcing (Frey and Stutzer, 2004) 
17 The most relevant effect is found in the case of a separation, sustaining the thesis that there exists also a 
factor of gradual adaptation to the different situations in life. 
18 They also show how sexual activity is greater in married subjects and how income, contrary to what we 
could provocatively expect, is not positively correlated neither to sexual activity nor to the number of 
partners. Also in this case, however, the impossibility of clearly identifying the direction of the causality 
nexus invites one to caution when interpreting the results.   
19 We are obviously faced here as well with a problem of identifying the direction of the causality nexus.  
20 This result confirms, if there were such a need, the ties of this literature with that on social capital 
(Putnam, 2000). 
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systematically lead the subjects to take the non-optimal decision. The explanations based on the 
importance of rival consumption or on the existence of externalities of the growth process do not 
require, instead, any failure of rationality. Subjects are perfectly rational and always reach the 
optimal decision from an individual viewpoint: due to the external effect of their actions, however, 
the results are not optimal at a social level. There is, in this case, a failure in coordination. From the 
viewpoint of economic theory, an explanation of the happiness paradox different from that of rival 
consumption and externality in the growth process must begin precisely from the explicit treatment 
of the failure of rationality.  
An in depth treatment of the theme of the failure of rationality is outside of the aims of this 
work21. We shall limit ourselves to furnishing some possible explanations of the reasons for which 
there may have been, in the last decades, a redistribution of consumer choices from relational goods 
to goods of private consumption, capable of participating in the explanation of the happiness 
paradox.  
What distinguishes relational goods from the greater part of normal consumer goods is that 
the former necessarily entail a greater degree of uncertainty and that they are, for the most part, 
ineffectual in signaling one’s status. If one desires a new model of cellular phone and one possesses 
the necessary sum, it is sufficient to enter the nearest store to ensure that one’s wish will be 
realized. If one wants to use the brand new cellular phone to invite the pretty sales woman of the 
store to dinner, one cannot be certain that one’s wish will be realized. To this we can add that 
relational goods are mostly lacking in status effect: precisely because consumption and production 
are joined and the time factor is fundamental, they risk signaling, on the contrary, a low opportunity 
cost of time and, therefore, a low social value of the individual. If the value of a person coincides 
with the price of one’s leisure time, then the signal sent by whoever spends time consuming these 
goods is that this person is not worth much. 
In the post war era, industrialized societies have become more and more fragmented at the 
social level: the dimension of the family nucleus has been reduced, due both to the lower birth rate 
as well as to changed life styles and a greater geographical mobility. There has been a significant 
urbanization process that has rarified and rendered more difficult extra-familiar relationships. The 
increasingly atomistic character of our societies has made interpersonal relationships more and 
more uncertain and superficial, rendering increasingly risky “the investment in emotional 
relationships”22. On the other hand, the same phenomenon of social fragmentation and greater 
geographical and social mobility has given a more important role to the signaling trait of individual 
choices. In an environment where I am not known, I can communicate my traits and my social role 
in a simple e direct manner through my consumption choices: the house I own, the car I drive, etc23. 
Thus the following thesis seems sufficiently plausible: in the last decades there has been a 
partial substitution of relational goods, which are uncertain and deficient in signaling one’s status, 
with material goods, which are certain and endowed one with status, with negative consequences on 
the level of SWB. 
Some empirical evidence can be brought forth at least as a partial confirmation of this thesis. 
There is some pretty strong data, for example, on the fact that the degree of materialism diffused in 
the culture of our society has been increasing. For materialism we intend a system of individual and 
collective values which gives a key importance to income, wealth and the possession of material 
                                                      
21 Few works explicitly treat this aspect; an interesting exception is represented by the model of Pugno 
(2004), who proposes a psycho-economic foundation for the failure of rationality. 
22 This phenomenon appears completely evident in the relationship between genders; the ever more 
precarious nature of conjugal or extra-conjugal unions makes it more and more risky to subtract resources 
and time from the accumulation of material goods in favor of the relationship. 
23 In a society divided into closed classes, one’s identity and social placement was exogenous and well 
known; in an atomistic and socially more mobile society, membership in a social status can be conquered 
through the consumption of goods that are externally apparent.  
10goods (Kasser and Kaneer, 2004). For example, it has been seen that the percentage of US college 
students who think that being very well off is very important passes from 40% in the Sixties to 75% 
in the Nineties (Lane, 2000). 
More recently, Nickerson et al. (2003) have shown how there is a relationship between the 
degree of materialism and SWB. They analyze materialism as a goal and not as a personality trait. 
The most interesting result is that the greater the importance that the individual places on the 
attainment of financial objectives (that is to say the greater are his/her materialistic aims), the lesser 
is his/her personal well being. It is even more intriguing to note that when personal well being is 
disaggregated in order to consider it in certain particular spheres, the major negative effect takes 
place in the sphere of family and friends. This would seem to be a confirmation of the fact that the 
effort to accumulate material wealth occurs, at least partially, at the price of the loss of the riches of 
one’s affections  
When we discuss the increasingly greater materialism found in our contemporary societies, 
we cannot but think that an important role is also played by advertising. One of the major 
differences between developed societies of fifty years ago and current ones lies, among other 
things, in the much greater significant weight of the advertisement barrage to which the individual 
is exposed since a tender age. The advertising message has not only increased drastically in 
quantitative terms, but it has been radically modified from the qualitative viewpoint. On the one 
side, it has made extraordinary gains in its efficacy thanks to the communicative power of 
television, which gathers the greatest part of the advertising expenditure of companies; on the other, 
is has become more and more pervasive in social life thanks to the complex systems of 
communication and marketing of companies, which tend to render increasingly dilute the 
distinction between information, (or indeed education) and advertisement.  
The effect of advertising is obviously that of increasing rival and status consumption 
because it presents and generalizes elevated standards of life and consumption24. But there is a more 
subtle and interesting effect of advertising. In the first place, since it is totally aimed at providing 
incentives for the consumption of material goods, it can distort individual choices by increasing the 
consumption of material goods and diminishing the consumption of relational goods; in second 
place, by often conveying the message through emotional mechanisms, for the greater part 
unconscious, it creates the felling that some relational goods can be substituted with material goods 
or that they can be obtained thanks to the consumption of material goods 25.  
3  Social preferences and reciprocity 
Whoever teaches microeconomics to students with no knowledge of economics cannot but 
perceive the difficulty these students feel in jointly accepting two ideas that are almost immediately 
proposed to them: the idea that the economic method can be extended to any problem involving a 
rational choice in conditions of scarcity and the idea that all subjects under all conditions act so as 
to maximize their own individual interest. On the contrary, their experience, which is easily 
generalizable, is that individuals do not all and not always act egoistically and that not everyone 
pursues solely individualistic objectives all the time. Otherwise they would not be able to find an 
explanation for why some individuals do charity work, pay higher prices for goods produced under 
fair trade conditions, sort their garbage for separate collection, go to vote, donate blood, etc. 26.  
                                                      
24 However, advertising increases also the difference between aspirations and their fulfillment, rendering 
quickly inadequate that which one has just obtained. 
25 A serene and happy family is a good that is not, alas for us, purchasable in the market: an advertising 
message that works can transmit the idea that by buying such a product one can, in part, acquire also a serene 
and happy family.  
26 Not only positive behavior is difficult to explain in the hypothesis of egoistical behavior; negative 
behavior is also not easily explained. How does one otherwise explain, for example, the destructive and 
sabotage-inclined behavior of an employee towards the company that fired him/her. Such behavior is not in 
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For the past couple of decades, a significant amount of experimental results has been 
accumulating, justifying the perplexities of students; this literature highlights that one cannot 
uncritically accept the thesis according to which economic subjects can be considered as mere 
maximizing agents of individual interests, without the risk of losing a good share of the explicative 
capacity of the economic model. The experimental evidence suggests that individual behavior 
cannot be completely understood without imagining that individuals possess social preferences, that 
is to say, that they also take into account the well being of others when they order possible 
alternatives27. We do not want to propose here a complete review of the by now vast literature on 
social preferences, or of the experimental results or of the theories that attempt to explain them28. 
3.1  The experimental results  
The experiment that gave life to this literature is the ultimatum game (UG), proposed in the 
work of Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982)29.  In the standard version, two players take part 
in this game: one player (proposer) can advance only a single proposal regarding the subdivision of 
a set sum of money between him/herself and the other player (responder). If the latter accepts, each 
of the players pockets the sum that the proposer has established; if, on the contrary, the responder 
does not accept, both players obtain a zero payoff. If the players are rational and perfectly informed, 
and if both are solely interested in material well being, then the solution is immediate. The 
responder will accept any positive sum (which is always greater than the nothing he/she would 
otherwise obtain); the proposer will anticipate this behavior and offer to the other the minimum 
amount possible30.  
The experimental evidence is, indeed, very different (Camerer, 2003, Tables 2.2 and 2.3). 
Proposers offer on average sums encompassed between 30% and 40% of the initial amount (and a 
not unimportant percentage even offer just half); responders refuse proposals that are less than 20% 
in approximately 50% of the cases. These results have shown themselves to be extraordinarily 
strong despite variations in geographic latitudes31, in the population of experimental subjects 
involved and in the size of the initial amount to be divided32. Particularly interesting is the result of 
the ambitious research that saw the involvement of both economists and anthropologists (Henrich et 
al. 2002). They repeated the ultimatum game (and other similar games) in fifteen small societies, 
scattered over four continents, with extremely diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds (from the 
Machiguenga population in Peru to the Torgund in Mongolia). The study shows that indeed some 
populations do exist, which behave as forecast by main stream theory, just as there are some ultra-
fair populations where the proposer offers more than half of the initial sum. Interestingly enough, 
two variables seem to explain fairly well the variability of the offers of the proposers: the amount of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the material interest of the fired employee: it requires time, it is not remunerated, exposes one to penal risks. 
Sobel (2004) builds his review on interdependent preferences and reciprocity on this example. 
27 A self-interested or egoistical individual, on the other hand, will not assign any importance to the results of 
other individuals. 
28 For a broader and more articulated treatment of this literature see Sobel (2004), Camerer (2003) and 
Camerer and Fehr (2004). 
29 “In 1982, Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarz reported the kind of empirical finding that surprises only 
economists”.  This is the ironic as much as symptomatic incipit of Camerer (2003). 
30 The proposer who offers the minimum and the responder who accepts it constitute the only perfect Nash 
equilibrium sub-game of this sequential game. 
31 Some studies have highlighted certain differences among developed countries (Roth et al., 1991), which, 
however, do not call into question the general result. 
32 In developed countries experimental subjects are recruited almost exclusively among university students, 
whereas in some developing countries it was possible to repeat the experiment using sums with a much 
greater purchasing power (up to several months of wages) with only modest effects on the rate of refusal of 
the responder and with nearly imperceptible effects on the average offer of the proposer (see, for example, 
Cameron, 1999). 
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collaborative activities or economies of scale in production (for example, group hunting systems) 
and the degree of market integration33. The first element is rather predictable and understandable: in 
societies where, for example, hunting is a necessarily collective and collaborative activity, social 
norms developed that discouraged less than fair proposals. The second element is, instead, much 
more intriguing; with the rise of the degree of market integration there is an increase in the offers of 
the proponents. This warns us that the relationship between market and self-interested behavior is 
much more complex than the main stream approach in economics seems to suggest (Bowles, 1998). 
This result could not be understood, I believe, if we did not take into account that for these 
populations market means mainly personal and individual relationships of exchange and, therefore, 
that along with the exchange of goods and services there is also a relational and affective exchange 
that stimulates social preferences, contrary to what we could assume. 
An offer of the proposer that is noticeably greater than one foreseen by standard theory can 
be due to altruism or to a preference for fairness, or simply to strategic behavior. Even the most 
self-interested proposer would offer a larger sum than the minimum, if he/she would expect that the 
responder would refuse proposals that are too low. In order to differentiate between strategic 
behavior and altruism, there is another interesting game called the dictator game, which does not 
foresee the possibility that the responder can refuse the offer. In practice, it is solely the proposer 
who divides the initial sum between him/herself and the other player. Obviously, a self-interested 
proposer would not give anything to the responder. The results of the experiments show how, in this 
case, the proposer offers a sum comprised between 10% and 25%, which is noticeably less than in 
the ultimatum game but nevertheless positive (the results of various experiments of the dictator 
game are summarized by Camerer, 2003 table 2.4.). This means that the strategic behavior of the 
proposer is not the only explanation for the high offers of the ultimatum game, since there is also a 
component of pure altruism. It is necessary to note that the results, in this case, are not as strong 
when some elements of the game are changed. If, for example, one introduces double anonymity 
(both in regards to the other player and to those conducting the experiments) then the sum left by 
the proposer diminishes in a tangible manner34. If anonymity is not bidirectional but the responder 
is identified while the proposer remains anonymous, it is interesting to note how the average offer 
remains constant but the number of proposers who offer zero diminishes (it is probably morally 
more costly to give nothing to a real person than to a virtual one), while the average sum left by the 
proposer increases noticeably if the proposer is asked to provide a brief presentation of him/herself 
(Bohnet and Frey, 1999), something that immediately creates a relationship between the two 
subjects 35. This variability is often interpreted by experimental economists as a weakness of the 
results and of the approach used, whereas, on the contrary, it is extraordinarily interesting and 
significant because it simply demonstrates how the “exchange” which occurs in the dictator game is 
strictly influenced by the relational component of the exchange itself, a component that must be 
considered if the results are to be completely understood.  
Whereas the behavior of the proposer can be explained either by resorting to strategic 
behavior or to the presence of social preferences, altruism, or, much more credibly, to both, the 
behavior of the responder is difficult to explain seen in a logic of mere material egoism. The 
responder who refuses a positive proposal, in fact, spends resources without obtaining any material 
good. It is obvious, therefore, that he/she must not only have at heart the material payoff, as 
                                                      
33 The degree of market integration is obtained by calculating an index that combines the existence of a 
national language, the presence of a salaried labor market and the existence of an agriculture oriented 
towards monetary exchange. 
34 For example, in Hofman et al. (1994), 70% of the subjects do not give anything and the remainder offers a 
sum comprised between 10% and 20%. 
35 More than understandably, when the responder is not a physical person but a charitable body worthy of a 
donation, for example, the Red Cross, the sum given by the proposer is noticeably higher (Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996). 
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traditional game theory has always assumed, but that his/her preferences must extend into other 
domains. Furthermore, it is interesting to note how the behavior of the responder is influenced not 
only by the size of the offer, as we have seen, but also by how this offer was determined and, 
therefore, by the behavior of the proposer. 
Various theories have been recently proposed to explain this behavior: they can be 
organized into two large groups. The first group contains those theories that simply substitute some 
function of social utility in the place of material payoff. In this case, it is assumed that preferences 
are interdependent and that utility depends also on the payoff of others. Classic examples are 
models that theorize an aversion towards inequality (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, and Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999). Preferences of this type render agents willing to sacrifice some resources in order 
to increase the material payoff of other agents if their payoff is at less than an equitable level, just as 
they are willing to diminish the payoff of other agents if the payoff of the latter is judged to be at a 
greater than “equitable” level.  
A second group of models advances the hypothesis that subjects possess a preference for 
reciprocity, that is to say, that they demonstrate a reciprocative behavior (Rabin, 1993, Falk and 
Fischerback, under print, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteigher, 2204). An individual is reciprocative 
if he/she reacts in a positive manner to friendly and supportive behavior and in a hostile fashion to 
antagonistic behavior, and the perception concerning the friendly or hostile nature of the action of 
other subjects will depend on both the fairness of the distribution of the payoffs resulting from these 
actions as also on the intentions of the other subjects. In many, but not in all, experimental contexts, 
subjects who are adverse to iniquity and reciprocative subjects are statistically indistinguishable, 
presenting similar behavior. From the theoretical viewpoint, instead, the hypotheses are rather 
different: in the case of aversion to inequality preferences are independent of the context in which 
the subject finds him/herself operating, whereas in the case of reciprocative behavior the analysis of 
the context in which the actions take place is fundamental for understanding the intentions of other 
subjects. For this reason, the first models are much more parsimonious and easy to manage than the 
second kind, whereas the latter, in my estimation, are much more interesting.  
The experimental evidence, moreover, seems more favorable to the second type of theory. In 
particular, it has been demonstrated that the intentions of the proposer are relevant for the decisions 
of the responder; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003), analyze a reduced ultimatum game in which 
the proposer has only two choices at his/her disposal regarding the allotment of ten experimental 
coins. If we confront two situations, the first in which the choice is restricted between an 
inequitable allocation in one’s favor (8,2) and an equitable one (5,5), and another in which the first 
option (8,2) contends with another inequitable allocation against one’s advantage (2,8), the rate of 
non-acceptance of the first situation is noticeably less than the second case. This unquestionably 
signals the fact that the responder takes into consideration not only the distribution of the material 
payoffs but also the quality of the action of the proposer. Assigning to the responder a minimum 
quota of the initial amount is judged in a significantly more negative manner if the proposer had the 
capacity to offer the equitable choice. It appears evident, also in this case, that the game cannot be 
completely understood without taking into account the relational component of the exchange.  
While in the ultimatum game the responder can punish a behavior of the proposer judged as 
hostile, in the gift exchange game (GEG), instead, he/she has the possibility of rewarding behavior 
judged as just or generous36. In the GEG, the proposer offers a sum w to the responder; the latter, if 
he/she accepts, must decide a level of effort e. The engagement lavished has a cost to the responder 
according to a generally convex function c(e). The monetary payoff of the proposer will be equal to 
πP = v e- w where v is the marginal value of the effort of the responder for the proposer; while the 
payoff of the responder will be simply πR  = w-c(e). If the responder were exclusively self-
interested, he/she should choose the lesser effort possible and accept any level of w. The responder 
who rationally anticipates this fact could but only propose the minimum payment and obtain the 
                                                      
36 This game was introduced by Fehr et al. 1993 
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minimum effort. The experimental results (Camerer, 2003) suggest, to the contrary, that average 
engagement is positively correlated to the payment offered by the proposer, signaling a 
reciprocative behavior of the responder who reacts with generous efforts to generous 
remuneration37.  
The interesting aspect of the game is based on the fact that it captures a classic principal-
agent relationship with contractual incompleteness (payment cannot be rendered contingent on the 
effort provided). A field of relevance is the labor market (see Fehr and Yachter, 2000), also due to 
the evident similarities with some theories aimed at explaining wages that are higher than the levels 
of competitive equilibrium, such as, for example, the theory of efficiency wages. But more in 
general, this experimental context can explain how considerations based on social preferences and 
on reciprocative behavior can have an effect on the contractual choices of subjects in a regime of 
informational asymmetry. Fehr et al, (2004), for example, show how considerations based on 
fairness in relationships can function better than monetary incentives as mechanism of enforcement 
in an incomplete contract.  
Another interesting experimental context is furnished by the public good game (PGG); this 
game generally employs an n number of subjects who must decide how much of an initial 
endowment (y) should be destined to the production of the public good (g). The payoff of the n
th 
player will be  ∑
=
+ − = π
n
1 i
i i i i g m g y where n is the number of players and m (1/n < m <1) is the 
unitary monetary value of the public good for each player. The hypothesis m <1 guarantees that 
each contributor does not have any personal incentive to contribute to the public good; mn > 1, 
assures, instead, that the aggregate payoff is maximized when all contribute. In presence of 
supremely egoistical preferences, the optimal strategy is that of not contributing: it is the behavior 
known as free riding. One avoids sharing in the expense in the hope that others will provide: since 
everyone reasons the same way, the public good is not produced38.  
The experimental results branch out in a different direction also in this case (Ledyard, 1995 
and Sally, 1995). When the game is played for only one period, the average contribution goes from 
40% to 60%; furthermore, it is interesting to note how the distribution of the contributions has a 
clearly bimodal form, testifying that there are people who act in an egoistical manner by not 
contributing anything and subjects who, instead, tend to give all. Even more interesting is the 
observation of how a communication that precedes the game, which should have no influence 
according to the standard theory, has a clearly positive effect on the average level of contribution.  
Even more intriguing are the results when the game is repeated more times. In this case, 
subjects begin to contribute as in the case of the game of one shot, but the average contribution 
tends to decline in time and, in the last periods, 75% of the subjects do not contribute anything at 
all, while the others contribute only marginally39. The decline of the rate of contribution, however, 
is not to be ascribed to the reemergence of egoistical behavior, after a first learning phase during 
which some subjects behave in a naive manner contributing much. In support of this, one can cite 
two experimental results worthy of note. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, (2001) show how subjects 
exhibit a reciprocative behavior (they are conditional cooperators) in the sense that they contribute 
more when they expect that others will do so as well.  
                                                      
37 Obviously, proposer and responder are never called to play the game together more than once and, 
therefore, the result is not influenced by behavior based on reputation mechanisms. 
38 The game has a structure of incentives wholly similar to the dilemma of prisoner: here as well we find a 
superior Pareto result, the contribution of all, which is not, however, a Nash equilibrium of the game. As for 
the dilemma of the prisoner, it is capable of describing situations in which externalities, both positive and 
negative, are to be found.  
39 The results are similar both in the case in which the group of contributors remains always the same and 
also when subjects are randomly mixed every time. 
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Even more interesting is the work of Fehr and Gächter (2000); they introduce the possibility 
that subjects can punish free riders at their expense. The game is articulated in two stages: in the 
first, a normal PGG is played; in the second, the subjects, after having been informed of the 
contributions of the others, can assign punishment points to each of the other players (the 
punishment mechanism is such that the cost which the sanctioned individual must pay is greater 
than the cost borne by the individual who sanctions). The result is important: on the one side, 
subjects have access to the possibility of sanctioning free riders 40 and, moreover, this is sufficient 
to guarantee elevated levels of contribution also in the final phases of the game41. The interpretation 
of this result is, in my estimation, as simple as it is illuminating. The possibility of explicitly 
sanctioning free riders has merely substituted the implicit sanction represented by the progressive 
diminution of voluntary contribution. In a standard PGG, the contributor has only one way to 
“punish” the free rider and respond to his/her hostile behavior: that to stop contributing in turn. In 
the version of Fehr and Gächter (2000), instead, the subject is furnished with a different and more 
effective mechanism of reaction: the direct punishment of the free rider. It is stimulating to observe 
that, ceteris paribus, a sole institutional change, represented by the introduction of the possibility of 
punishment, has dramatically modified individual behavior and has altered even more the way in 
which subjects interact. While the first institutional context (the standard PGG) has compressed and 
inhibited social preferences, the second (PGG with punishment) has exalted them, allowing the 
achievement of a superior Pareto result. The relationship between social preferences, individual 
behavior and institutional mechanisms is of extraordinary interest but it has still been treated with 
the due attention by the literature. 
3.2  Neuro-evidence 
Neuroscience utilizes the study of images of the brain and other techniques to obtain information on 
the operation of the human brain. The new discipline of neuro-economics applies this methodology 
to the study of subjects engaged in decisions of an economic type, in other words it attempts to 
found the decision-making process of an economic type on the bio-physical workings of the human 
brain (Camerer et al. forthcoming). 
One of the most interesting studies, and one that is also nearest to the argument of this work, 
is that of Safley et al. (2003). They monitor the cerebral activity of subjects involved in an 
ultimatum game; they use functional magnetic resonance, which studies the blood streams in the 
various areas of the brain, thus creating a map of the regions of the brain subjected to a greater 
activity. By confronting the cerebral activity of subjects to whom a strongly inequitable proposal (1 
or 2 dollars on 10) was made with the cerebral activity of subjects who received a fair proposal (4 
or 5 dollars on 10), they highlight how an unjust proposal sets in function three different cerebral 
regions. The first (DLPFC) is the area that is judged to be assigned to planning and computation; 
the second (Insula) is the area that is known to be activated while one experiences negative 
emotions such as pain and disgust; the third (ACC) presides over executive activities and when it 
receives stimuli from various cerebral regions it is called to settle possible conflicts among them. It 
is as if the final decision were the result of the resolution of the conflict between the desire to accept 
a monetary reward and the sense of aversion for the unjust treatment to which a subject believes 
he/she has been subjected.  
Of equal interest is the contribution of de Quervain et al. (2204), who monitor (using 
positron emission tomography) the cerebral activity of subjects engaged in a trust game 42 to which 
                                                      
40 And this is interesting in itself: seen that there is no individual advantage in sanctioning a free rider, a self-
interested subject should never sanction. 
41 It is interesting to note how low the level of sanctions is in the last periods: it is the sole threat of 
sanctions, wielded in the preceding periods, to exert a positive effect on the rate of cooperation. 
42 The trust game is similar to the GEG. In the work under consideration there are two players, A and B; each 
player receives ten experimental coins. Player A, who makes the first move, can decide to give part of his/her 
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is added the possibility of punishing a subject who has shown him/herself as non-cooperative and 
who has not repaid a part of the sum obtained thanks to the initial amount given by the first player. 
The punishment can be both symbolic (lacking in effects on the material well being of B) and 
effective (capable of reducing the monetary payoff of B). Both free (for A) forms of punishment 
and costly forms of sanctions are considered. Since the game is played in perfect anonymity and the 
players are randomly associated, the punishment is a completely altruistic action, given that the 
individual who punishes does not obtain any monetary return, neither in the present or in the future, 
from the punishment. An interesting result is achieved: an effective punishment, if confronted with 
a symbolic one, activates the dorsal stratum of the brain, an area which is associated by neuro-
scientific literature to the achievement of a reward as a result of a premeditated action. In other 
words, player A obtains satisfaction when he/she punishes the deviant behavior of B. Moreover, 
he/she is willing to pay a price in monetary terms in order to obtain this satisfaction: researchers 
have observed, in fact, that subjects with a greater activation of the dorsal stratum are more willing 
to pay a higher price to punish deviant behavior. 
As appears evident, these results do not contradict the preceding reasoning; on the one side, 
they can easily be interpreted as a bio-foundation of the existence of preferences that are not merely 
aimed at the maximization of the monetary payoff. On the other side, they provide an organistic 
justification to the hypothesis aired often in this as in other forums: when subjects make their 
decisions they do not consider only the results of actions but also the actions themselves. It is the 
act itself of punishing the free rider which provides satisfaction and pleasure and not that which is 
obtained by punishing the same. This observation allows us to understand, for example, why 
unemployed subjects report an inferior subjective well being with respect to employed subjects, 
even in presence of a total monetary compensation of the lost wages; what is lacking, in this case, is 
the pleasure, the satisfaction, that is obtained by feeling occupied and socially integrated. 
3.3  Social preferences and individual behavior  
The analysis of the experimental literature prompts a first important result: it displays in a 
fairly incontrovertible manner that the subjects who are being analyzed are heterogeneous. While it 
confirms the existence of subjects (and not just a slight minority) who behave in terms that are very 
close to those forecast by standard economic theory, it also shows that there is a significant 
component of subjects that behave in a manner which does not conform to the hypothesis of the 
maximization of personal material well being and renders manifest, therefore, the existence of 
social preferences. 
This result is strengthened even more by the observation, also consolidated by now, that this 
is not due to the naïve behavior of the subjects or to their erroneous understanding of the situation 
in which they find themselves acting. Two very simple arguments can be brought forth in support of 
this statement. In the first place, the extraordinary simplicity of many, if not of all, experimental 
situations that we have analyzed makes it very difficult to maintain that there are serious learning 
problems. In the second place, the results of other experiments, for example those based on the 
simulation of competitive markets, that attest how subjects act in a manner that is efficient and 
which conforms to standard theory in other situations in which social preferences are not relevant.  
Furthermore, not even all subjects who reveal social preferences are completely 
homogeneous: some, probably a minority, are simply endowed with exquisitely altruistic 
preferences, that is to say, when they make a decision they also take into account the well being of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
payoff to player B; the experimenter quadruplicates the sum. Now B must decide how much to give back to 
A. The name of the game derives from the fact that A must base his/her choices on the behavior of B and 
must rely on the spirit of cooperation and fairness of this individual. Informed of the behavior of B, A can 
decide to punish the behavior of B by assigning monetary punishment points; the punishment can be both 
symbolic (that is to say lacking in material effects on the payoff of B) and effective and can be either free or 
costly for A. 
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others. Others, probably the majority, display reciprocative behavior, that is to say, they reply in a 
friendly and good-natured manner to good-natured behavior and respond in a negative manner to 
egoistical behavior. 
Another very interesting and strong result is the one that shows how subjects do not take 
into account only the results, material but also non-material, of their actions and of those of the 
subjects with which they interact, but how they assign a non-marginal importance also to the way in 
which these results were shaped. Subjects weigh the actions of the subjects with which they interact 
and tend to behave in a different manner according to their evaluation of the behavior of others. In 
other terms, the arguments of the function of utility of the subjects do not encompass only the 
outcomes of the actions, but also the actions themselves, be they their own or those of others. 
Lastly, we cannot conceal an important limit of the experimental approach: economics is not 
and will never be an experimental science, as are chemistry and physics. In these disciplines, in 
fact, it is possible to frame an experiment in which the object of study is analyzed by eliminating all 
external influences except, obviously, those controlled by the experimenters. In economics this is 
not possible because in this case the object of study is a person whose characteristics, culture, past 
experiences, etc., can never be perfectly controlled. If one wants to observe the motion of a ball in a 
void, given the chemical and physical characteristics of the material of which the ball is made, one 
ball is perfectly replaceable with another of identical characteristics; a person can never be perfectly 
substituted with another, because each individual carries his/her own personal characteristics and 
personal history into the laboratory. On the other hand, it remains a fact that a world reconstructed 
in a laboratory is a mere over-simplified caricature of the real world. Experimental literature, 
therefore, stands at a crossroads: a greater contextualization of the experiments would permit a 
more realistic and detailed representation of the real world, but it would increase the influences not 
controlled by experimenters, jeopardizing the generality of the results. However, given the 
impossibility of eliminating the influence of external elements, the only reasonable path is to 
introduce a controlled contextualization of the experiments43.  
4  Happiness, social preferences and economic policy 
The economic policy implications of these results are interesting and, to some degree, 
explosive. 
The first and most evident implication concerns the goals of economic policy: if it possible 
to obtain reliable measurements of the level of individual well being of people, we return to the idea 
of classical economists that it is possible to target social choices towards the maximization of the 
happiness of individuals. In this perspective, the maximization of the material product of human 
utility, the GDP, can no longer be considered neither as the sole but not even as the most important 
indicator of the economic progress of a collectivity. The literature on happiness has in fact shown 
how personal well being depends significantly on variables that are not available in the market, 
whereas experimental literature tells us that very often the way in which the outcome is obtained 
matters as much, or maybe even more, than the outcome itself.  
The exclusive attention paid to national income had already been subjected to criticism, 
especially from the environmental point of view, and various alternative and environmental 
methodologies of accounting had been proposed. Now it is clear that the criticism of the centrality 
of GDP acquires greater strength and generality: criticism of GDP does not stem exclusively 
because it underestimates the environmental costs of industrial development, but because it 
constitutes only one, and not even the most important one, of the determinants of personal well 
being in developed societies. Moreover, the approach based on happiness economics makes it 
possible to calculate the costs and benefits of various activities in a different fashion: one can assign 
                                                      
43 In my opinion a total de-contextualization, which certain experimentalists would seem to hope for if not 
propose, is not only impossible, but even if it were, it would betray the prime motive in the interest of th
experimental approach.   
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a value in monetary terms also to things that are intangible and lacking in, one would have thought, 
an explicit economic worth, such as marriage and divorce, health, equality or inequality, pollution 
of a river44. In this manner, certain trade-offs, typical of many social decisions, can be tackled with 
greater cognitive tools.  
The happiness literature has shown, in first instance, how the loss of one’s job is a very 
significant determinant of personal well being, and this fact is verified in any country taken into 
consideration. It represents a truly disastrous event in one’s life, similar to a divorce or to the loss of 
a dear one. The effect of losing one’s job does not appear to be even marginally compensated by the 
increase in the consumption of leisure time, as would have suggested by a mostly academic 
economic approach. If the loss of one’s job has such forceful effects on individual well being, it 
should not come as a surprise that the level of job security also constitutes an important determinant 
of well being. 
Two considerations appear interesting. The first is of a purely cultural nature: the flexibility 
of the labor market and of the workplace is seen more and more, both in economic literature and in 
current publications, as a value in itself, ignoring or underestimating its price. The happiness 
literature highlights, on the contrary, that flexibility has a significant cost in terms of the diminution 
of personal well being. One could object that in times of global competition some kind of trade-off 
can emerge between the level of employment and job stability, or perhaps between job stability and 
remuneration. The second aspect worthy of interest is that this trade-off cannot be solved at an 
individual level: in a world where information is imperfect and asymmetrical and where the effort 
of the single worker cannot be monitored with effectiveness, an employee who would volunteer to 
work at a lower wage in exchange for greater job stability, would simply risk signaling a lesser 
competence or desire to work. It stands to reason, therefore, that this trade-off can be considered 
and managed only at a collective level.  
A wholly similar analysis can be conducted concerning work rhythms. Excessively high 
work rhythms induce a reduction in personal well being, a trivial observation confirmed by 
research; but it is equally easy to observe how it is very difficult for a person to choose an optimal 
work rhythm due to the problems of informational asymmetry seen previously.  
An interesting corollary of the previous analysis is that new frontiers are opened for public 
intervention based on completely different predicates from those that have been advanced in the 
past. Only a collective effort managed and protected by a specifically created policy can allow an 
individual to reach a level of well being to which he/she could not singly aspire. In times in which it 
is believed that the only defensible economic policy is one aimed at reducing as much as possible 
the intervention of the state in economic affairs, this literature proposes an example that goes 
against the trend: superior results in terms of personal well being can be obtained only by acting 
collectively. It appears clear, therefore, that one of the messages of the literature analyzed is that 
there still exists an entirely unexplored region for an economic policy with the objective of 
increasing individual well being alongside with material wealth. On the other hand, equally granted 
is that this literature not only requires interventions in economic policy that are utterly innovative, 
regarding both goals as well as tools, but that is also furnishes a new and more powerful 
justification for measures of economic policy of a more traditional flavor. For example, the 
progressive taxation of income finds its justification no longer based on purely ethical 
considerations, as much as on economic ones: if we have a situation of relative consumption and if 
also income in itself has become a positional good per se, then progressive taxation serves simply to 
partially correct the inefficiency determined by the externality of relative consumption. Another 
example is the institution of the collective labor contract so diffuse in Europe and never more than 
today subject to strong criticism, especially by economists. Only a coordinated and collective 
                                                      
44 One can easily foresee a rapid use of civil law in settlement claim lawsuits of this literature, at least in 
countries following Anglo-Saxon law. 
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bargaining for wages and working conditions is capable of managing the process of economic 
globalization without involving enormous costs in terms of happiness and personal well being. 
On the other hand, the results of the literature analyzed previously seem to suggest the 
necessity of finding innovative measures of economic policy capable of stimulating personal 
happiness. The first and most important element of a policy favoring happiness seems to be an 
operation of cultural policy. One of the most important aspects of current culture is that the 
materialistic and consumer message is increasingly diffuse at a social level and more and more 
pervasive in social life from earliest childhood on. It is almost impossible to escape the continuous 
messages that suggest that a life full of meaning and happiness can be mainly, if not exclusively, 
obtained thanks to the accumulation of wealth and the possession of goods aimed mostly at 
conquering the right outward image and a high status. Still, empirical research has demonstrated 
that this recipe is not capable of providing well being and happiness, neither at an individual level 
nor at a collective one: on the contrary, it shows how the more importance people assign to 
materialistic goals and objectives, the less they are apt to be happy in their personal life and how 
much greater the probabilities lie that they will act against the social interest or the environment 
(Kasser, 2002).  
In this view, an economic policy aimed at contrasting the diffusion of materialism does not 
respond exclusively to a need of a moral type, which would not be defensible, at least using 
economic argumentations, but it can easily be justified employing argumentations based on the 
efficiency and maximization of collective happiness. This is not the forum in which to analyze in 
detail what forms this policy should assume, apart from the obvious consideration that whatever it 
may be, it may not damage the unassailable freedom of each individual to discover his own road to 
happiness 45. We cannot, however, avoid mentioning the problem of the increasingly marked and 
diffuse role of the advertising message in everyday life. Two measures of economic policy could be 
considered. The first measure is to create advertisement-free areas where the advertising message is 
not allowed, neither in a direct nor indirect form: schools, broadcasts and publications for children 
and adolescents, universities. And, anyhow, it would seem opportune to employ all possible 
measures to always clearly separate information (and obviously, education) and advertising, by 
removing the incentives found in all those grey areas in which the line between the two is so thin 
that it risks not being perceived, at least by the weakest subjects. Furthermore, all newspaper 
publications and all broadcasts and/or television networks without, or with limited, advertising 
should be supported through opportune forms of economic incentives46. 
The second measure is the classic one of imposing taxes on advertising, capable of 
internalizing at least in part the external effects of advertisement on collective happiness; the goal 
would be both to reduce the production and consumption of the advertisement product and to 
provide resources to finance advertisement-free o advertisement-light projects.  
The economic policy implications of the literature mentioned above, however, suggest also a 
profound modification of the modalities of economic policy. On the one hand, the analysis of this 
literature cannot but involve a rethinking of the relationship that exists between institutions and 
individual behavior. When analyzing the role of institutional mechanisms, economists have always 
imagined that an institutional context could modify individual behavior if, and only if, it modified 
                                                      
45 The danger of flowing over into a moralistic and paternalistic sense of the implications of economic policy 
in this literature is evident and must be recognized, also because the fact that, on average, materialism does 
not lead to happiness, does neither eliminate the possibility that for someone happiness does coincide with 
materialism, nor can it come to deny the right of each individual to freely choose his/her own destiny.    
46 In many European countries, we are witnessing a radical transformation of the television sector with the 
proliferation of digital technology, both through satellite and terrestrial reception. It is sad to observe that in 
the debate on the new legislative collocation of the sector, no attention has been placed at all on legislation 
covering advertising. 
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the relationship between actions and the results of these actions47. The results discussed above have 
underscored that subjects are heterogeneous and that they take into account the manner in which 
their results are obtained; this, on the contrary, seems to suggest that institutional contexts and, 
therefore, measures of economic policy are capable of acting also on individual preferences, 
succeeding in orienting and modifying them. Thus emerges another fashion of understanding 
economic policy: one based on the study of an institutional design that is more capable of exploiting 
in a pro-social manner the heterogeneity of individual preferences and the capacity of individual 
preferences of being strongly influenced by the surrounding environment. Among all social 
scientists, the economist is the only one, aside from certain praiseworthy exceptions (Bowles, 
1998), who still assumes that individual preferences are totally exogenous and that they are not and 
cannot be influenced by the institutional context or by the choices of other economic subjects, 
companies or consumers48.  
On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that it is already possible to plan tools that are 
capable of integrating social preferences in the market mechanism. A first and trivial example is 
that based on the diffusion of social and environmental certifications of goods. Up to now, 
certifications have mostly been an answer to a request of information on the quality of the product; 
they came to partially heal, therefore, the imperfection that had been determined by the 
informational asymmetry between producers and consumers on the quality of the product and thus 
on its actual capacity to satisfy the need for which the good had been bought49. The existence of 
social preferences explains the reason for the diffusion of certifications of an altruistic type, such as 
environmental and social certifications of certain products and services. These certifications, just as 
some specific sales channels (such as the circuit of fair trade stores), are a guarantee to the 
consumer that certain principles, aimed either at protecting the environmental equilibrium or at 
guaranteeing the respect of some basic human and social rights, have been respected during 
production. Such certifications do not provide information on the nature of the product, that is to 
say, they do not inform on the result of the act of buying (for example, by increasing the probability 
of being satisfied by the fruition of the good or service if a superior quality is certified), but they 
furnish information, to which the single consumer does not have access, on the way the goods and 
services have been produced. In a main stream view, this information is irrelevant since it does not 
modify the nature of the product and, therefore, the result of the choice; the literature analyzed in 
this paper demonstrates, instead, that, at least for a part of the subjects under examination, the 
modality with which one arrives at a certain results matters and influences the judgment of the 
subjects concerning the payoff of their actions. The presence of these certifications in the market 
and the fact that there are subjects willing to pay a higher price for a good that is identical but 
provided with a social certification shows that this result is not only experimental but that it exists 
also outside of the laboratory.  
5  Conclusions 
This work wanted to take into consideration two branches of the recent literature that have 
advanced serious criticisms to the main assumption that is at the base of traditional economic 
theory: that which defines the economic subject as an individual with the exclusive goal of 
maximizing his/her individual material interest and its corollary, which suggests that this is the road 
for reaching the maximum possible level of happiness.  
                                                      
47 An indirect tax, for example, can reduce the demand for a good because it increases the price of the good 
for the consumer, that is to say, it reduces the quantity of the good that can be purchased with a given 
amount of resources. 
48 That this hypothesis is totally counterfactual is witnessed, if by nothing else, by the size of the investment 
of companies in marketing and advertisement with the main goal of modifying the preferences of consumers 
to their advantage.  
49 It is, therefore, completely compatible with a shrewd but egoistical consumer. 
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This work started from a critical analysis of the existing literature regarding the economics 
of happiness and of social preferences, two separate but strongly interconnected branches of 
analysis.  
From the critical considerations on these two branches of literature, we successively moved 
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